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Abstract
Negotiation plays a fundamental role in e-commerce. In this paper, the application of defeasible
logic for automated negotiation is investigated. Defeasible logic is flexible enough to be adapted
to several possible negotiation strategies, has efficient implementations, and provides a formal
basis for analysis (e.g. to explain why a negotiation was not successful). Two case studies, one
small and one more comprehensive, will be described and the feasibility of approaches based
on defeasible logic will be discussed.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Commerce, whether it is conducted over the WWW or not, involves the exchange of goods or
services for money. Typically three phases can be identified: information discovery (where one
learns what is available, from whom and where), negotiation (where the terms of the exchange
are decided), and settlement and delivery (where the transaction is completed). In this paper
focus is on automated support for the negotiation phase.
In an e-commerce setting support for negotiation needs to be efficient, transparent, and expres-
sive. It should be possible to specify negotiation strategies, tactics, and rules fairly straightfor-
wardly. In the last few years the relevance of argumentation theory to capture negotiation and its
protocols has been argued (cf. for example Prakken, forthcoming; Loui, 1998). Governatori and
Maher (2000); Governatori et al. (2000) have estabilished a close connection between argumen-
tation theory and Defeasible Logic, and Antoniou et al. (2000a,b) have shown that Defeasible
Logic is flexible enough to be adapted to several possible argumentation strategies. Moreover,
Defeasible Logic has very efficient implementations able to deal with propositional theories of
over 100,000 rules (Maher et al., 2000). This together with the above mentioned relationship
allow us to use Defeasible Logic for modelling automated negotiation.
One of the advantages of Defeasible Logic over semantic based argumentation systems is its
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fully constructive proof theory, both for positive and negative conclusions (a negative conclu-
sion means that something is demonstrably not provable). This is an important feature in the
context of negotiation since it allows one to pinpoint the causes/reasons why an agreement
cannot be reached.
In this paper focus is on the application of defeasible logic for automated negotiation. Two case
studies, one small and one more comprehensive, will be described and the feasibility of ap-
proaches based on defeasible logic will be discussed. In addition, directions for future research
are identified.
2 BASICS OF DEFEASIBLE LOGIC
We begin by presenting the basic ingredients of defeasible logic (cf. Billington, 1993). A
defeasible theory contains six different kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules,
defeaters, a superiority relation, and a specification of complementary literals. We only consider
rules that are essentially propositional. Rules containing free variables are interpreted as the set
of their ground instances.
Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Tweety is an emu”. Written formally, this
would be expressed as emu(tweety).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable (e.g. facts)
then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “Emus are birds”. Written formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X)
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of such a rule
is “Birds typically fly”; written formally:
bird(X)⇒ f lies(X)
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may conclude that it flies, unless
there is other evidence suggesting that it may not fly.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to prevent
some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing
evidence to the contrary. An example is “If an animal is heavy then it might not be able to fly”.
Formally:
heavy(X); ¬ f lies(X)
The main point is that the information that an animal is heavy is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that it doesn’t fly. It is only evidence against the conclusion that a heavy animal
flies. In other words, we don’t wish to conclude ¬ f lies if heavy, we simply want to prevent a
conclusion f lies.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that is, where one
rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the facts
→ bird
→ brokenWing
and the defeasible rules
r : bird ⇒ f lies
r′ : brokenWing ⇒¬ f lies
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a bird with
a broken wing can fly. But if we introduce a superiority relation  with r′  r, then we can
indeed conclude that the bird cannot fly. The superiority relation is required to be acyclic.
For each literal p we define the set of p-Complementary literals (C (p)), that is, the set of
literals that cannot hold when p does. Let us consider an example; let us suppose we have
the predicates married and bachelor. Here, we define, for any constant a, C (married(a)) =
{¬married(a),bachelor(a)}. We know that, under the usual interpretation of the predicates
they cannot be true at the same time for one and the same individual. We stipulate that the
negation of a literal is always complementary to the literal.
Now we present formally defeasible logics. A rule r consists of its antecedents (or body) A(r)
which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent (or head) C(r) which is a literal.
There are three kinds of arrows, →, ⇒ and ; which correspond, respectively, to strict rules,
defeasible rules and defeaters. Where the body of a rule is empty or consists of one formula
only, set notation may be omitted in examples.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs, the set of strict and
defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd , and the set of defeaters in
R by Rd f t . R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q, and R[C (q)] denotes the set of
rules in R whose consequent is in C (q).
A defeasible theory D is a structure
D = (F,R,,C )
where F is a finite set of facts, R is a finite set of rules,  is a binary relation over R, and C is a
function mapping a literal to a set of literals.
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal, where a tag is either ∂ or ∆, that may have positive or
negative polarity.
+∆q which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using only strict rules).
−∆q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D = R. A derivation is a finite
sequence P = (P(1), . . .P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying four conditions (which correspond to
inference rules for each of the four kinds of conclusion). In the following P(1..i) denotes the
initial part of the sequence P of length i.
+∆:
If P(i+1) = +∆q then
∃r ∈ Rs[q]
∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P(1..i)
−∆:
If P(i+1) =−∆q then
∀r ∈ Rs[q]
∃a ∈ A(r) :−∆a ∈ P(1..i)
The definition of ∆ describes just forward chaining of strict rules. For a literal q to be definitely
provable we need to find a strict rule with head q, of which all antecedents have been definitely
proved previously. And to establish that q cannot be proven definitely we must establish that
for every strict rule with head q there is at least one antecedent which has been shown to be
non-provable.
Now we turn to the more complex case of defeasible provability.
+∂: If P(i+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) ∀p ∈ C (q)−∆p ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[C (q)] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and t > s
−∂: If P(i+1) =−∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.2) ∃p ∈ C (q) such that +∆p ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[C (q)] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or t 6> s
Let us work through the condition for +∂, an analogous explanation holds for −∂. To show that
q is provable defeasibly we have two choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely provable;
or (2) we need to argue using the defeasible part of D as well. In particular, we require that there
must be a strict or defeasible rule with head q which can be applied (2.1). But now we need to
consider possible “attacks”, that is, reasoning chains in support of a complementary of q. To
be more specific: to prove q defeasibly we must show that every complementary literal is not
definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider the set of all rules which are not known
to be inapplicable and which have head in C (q) (note that here we consider defeaters, too,
whereas they could not be used to support the conclusion q; this is in line with the motivation of
defeaters given in subsection 2.1). Essentially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to
be provable, each such rule s must be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the following
properties: (i) t must be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than s. Thus each
attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger rule.
3 NEGOTIATION AND DEFEASIBLE LOGIC: TWO CASE STUDIES
In this section we present in details two examples of the application of Defeasible Logic to au-
tomated negotiation scenarios. In the first example (Section 3.1) we consider a case of brokered
trade, and we show how to use Defeasible Logic (1) to select goods against a set of constraints,
and (2) to choose the most appropriate good. Then (Section 3.2) we consider a simple case of
negotiation: single issue bargaining. Here Defeasible Logic is used both in the protocol and in
the dispute phases.
3.1 Case Study 1: Brokered Trade
Brokered trades take place via an independent third party (broker). The broker matches both
buyers’ and sellers’ requirements, and will propose a transaction when all parties can be satisfied
by the trade.
Suppose we have the following scenario: Andrew contacts a broker, he wants to buy a yacht
under 5 years old, at least 60 ft for around $130,000. He is flexible and will pay more (with a
limit of $150,000) for a younger or bigger yacht. He thinks that each extra foot is worth $1000
and each year of age less than 5 years adds $3000 to the value of the yacht.
He rates the importance of achieving the price level of $130,000 more than the importance of
either the age or size of the yacht. However, he prefers a younger boat over a longer one.
The broker has five yachts to sell: the first is 60 ft and 2 years old, the price is $140,000. The
second is 70 ft and 1 year old, the price is $150,000. The third yacht is 100 ft and 5 years old
with a price of $170,000. The fourth is 3 years old and 50 ft with a price of $125,000. Finally
the fifth is 80 ft and 3 years old with a price of $150,000.
The above data can be summarized in Table 1. The scenario presented above can be represented
Yacht Length Age Price (000)
1st 60 2 140
2nd 70 1 150
3rd 100 5 170
4th 50 3 125
5th 80 3 150
Table 1: Yacht details
as a two stage process. In the first phase we filter the yachts according to their characteristics
and against Andrew’s desiderata. At this point the most appropriate boat can be chosen. This
process can be represented formally in terms of two correlated defeasible theories: the first for
filtering and the second for choosing.
The language of the first defeasible theory (D f = (Ff ,R f , f ,C f )) includes the following terms
and predicates:
• length(x) the length of the yacht;
• age(x) how old the yacht is;
• offer(x,y) meaning how much (y) Andrew is ready to pay for the yacht x;
• price(x,y) meaning the price (y) of the yacht x;
• buyable(x) meaning whether the yacht x meets Andrew’s conditions;
The set of facts (Ff ) is just the set of predicates that can be deduced from Table 1, while the
rules (R f ) can be expressed as follows:
1. f1 : length(x)< 60 f t ⇒¬buyable(x)
2. f2 : age(x)> 5yrs⇒¬buyable(x)
3. f3 : price(x,y),y > $150⇒¬buyable(x)
4. f4 : ⇒ offer(x,$130)
5. f5 : length(x)> 60 f t ⇒ offer(x,($130+g(length(x))))
6. f6 : age(x)< 5yrs⇒ offer(x,($130+h(age(x))))
7. f7 : age(x)< 5yrs, length(x)> 60 f t ⇒ offer(x,($130+g(length(x))+h(age(x))))
8. f8 : offer(x,y)⇒ buyable(x)
9. f9 : offer(x,y),price(x,z),y < z⇒¬buyable(x)
where the superiority relation  f is thus defined: f1  f8, f2  f8, f3  f8, f9  f8 as far as the
rules for buyable are concerned, and f5  f4, f6  f4, f7  f4, f7  f5, and f7  f6 for offer.
Finally C maps each literal to its negation. Moreover for each x,y we have that offer(x,z), such
that z 6= y is in C (offer(x,y)).
The first three rules state the minimal requirements; the fourth rule sets the basic offer for
a generic boat, while f5, f6 and f7 represent Andrew’s “flexibility” refining the offer for a
specific bigger or younger yacht. Rule f8 says two things 1) that the yacht x meets Andrew’s
requirements, and that Andrew has set an offer of y for that yacht. However, rule f9 is used to
see whether the offer matches the price of the yacht.
The condition on C states that there is at most one unique offer for a given yacht.
The second theory (Dc), for choosing, requires the following additional predicates:
• min price(x) meaning that the yacht x is the cheapest of the selected ones;
• min age(x) saying that the yacht x is the youngest of the selected ones;
• max length(x) which is true for the longest yacht;
• buy(x) saying that x is the most suitable candidate.
The rules for selecting the most appropriate boat are:
• c1 : min price(x)⇒ buy(x)
• c2 : min age(x)⇒ buy(x)
• c3 : max length(x)⇒ buy(x)
where the superiority relation is c1  c2, c1  c3, and c2  c3. Since only one boat has to be
selected the complementary literals area as follows: C (buy)(x) = {¬buy(x)}∪{buy(y)|y 6= x}.
We are now ready to present the filtering and choosing processes in detail. Let us consider the
first yacht. The first three rules are not applicable for it, thus to see whether it is a suitable boat
we have to calculate its value. Rules f5 and f7 are not applicable. On the other hand, both
f4 and f6 are applicable, but f6 is the strongest of the two, and no applicable rule defeats it,
therefore we can conclude +∂offer(1,$139). At this point f9 becomes applicable, it defeats f8,
but it is not defeated by it, thus we can derive −∂buyable(1). So, we have that the first yacht is
too expensive and it is not a suitable candidate for the deal.
It is immediate to see that we can derive−∂buyable(3), and−∂buyable(4). The former because
rule f1 is applicable, that is the boat is too short, and the latter because rule f3 is applicable, that
is, its price is out of the price range.
The first three rules are not applicable for 2 and 5. Thus, similarly to what we have done in
the previous case, we have to determine their values, and we have, using r7, +∂offer(2,$152)
and +∂offer(5,$156), which makes r9 applicable for both yachts. Then +∂buyable(2) and
+∂buyable(5). Thus the second and the fifth yachts are ones that will be used in the second
phase.
The actual defeasible theory we obtain in this case consists of the following instances of rules
• r1 : min price(2)⇒ buy(2)
• r2 : min price(5)⇒ buy(5)
• r3 : min age(2)⇒ buy(2)
• r4 : min age(5)⇒ buy(5)
• r5 : max length(2)⇒ buy(2)
• r6 : max length(5)⇒ buy(5)
where r1,2  r3,4,5,6, r3,4  r5,6.
The complementary literals are thus defined: C (buy(2)) = {¬buy(2),buy(5)}, and C (buy(5)) =
{¬buy(5),buy(2)}, meaning that only one yacht will be bought.
The first two rules are not applicable since there is not a boat with the lowest price; rules r4 and
r5 are not applicable since 5 is not the youngest yacht and 2 is not the longest. Then the only
applicable rules are r3 and r6, but we know that r3 is stronger than r6. So we derive +∂buy(2).
This means that the second yacht is the most appropriate one according to Andrew’s conditions.
3.2 Case Study 2: Simple Negotiation (Bargaining)
A negotiation is a discussion between parties for the purpose of reaching an agreement. This
suggests representing a negotiation as a dialogue between parties, this dialogue is articulated in
progressive stages, where the parties make offers, reject or accept offers, or propose counter-
offers. In this view it can be thought of as a special kind of argumentation where we have two
different aspects: the protocol and the content of the negotiation (cf. Prakken, forthcoming).
The protocol describes the rules of the dispute, for example how the parties exchange their
offers, and how and when the negotiation can go on or terminate.
Here, for the sake of simplicity, we consider only one-to-one negotiations, that is, negotiations
where only two parties are involved —let us call them the Proponent and the Opponent. In this
perspective we can formally represent a negotiation as three sequences of defeasible theories.
The first sequence records the evolution of the protocol, while the second and the third theories
are used to store the knowledge bases or defeasible theories (DT) of the two parties.
Graphically a negotiation can be depicted as follows
Stage 1 Protocol1 Proponent DT1 Opponent DT1
Stage 2 Protocol2 Proponent DT2 Opponent DT2
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Another element we have to take into account is the negotiation strategy, that is the mecha-
nism for passing from one stage to the next. Several negotiation strategies can be devised, for
example:
• single fixed theory: a party uses a single defeasible theory through the whole negotiation,
which is evaluated using new data that becomes available during the negotiation.
• fixed sequence of theories; here a party fixes a sequence of theories for the whole negoti-
ation.
• parameterized theories: a party defines a set of rules that can be triggered or modified
according to the stage of the negotiation.
• revision of theories: a party modifies the actual theory from stage to stage according to
the result of the previous stage.
Finally we have to specify how the offers are exchanged between the parties. First of all the par-
ties do not have to disclose every piece of information they have, thus we partition the defeasible
theory of a party into two parts: the public part, whose conclusions have to be disclosed to the
other party, and a private part. The Proponent computes its theory obtaining a set of conclusions
and the public conclusions are passed to the Opponent that uses them to supplement its facts; at
this point the Opponent theory is computed. According to the result of this last computation we
can have three possible results: the Opponent accepts the Proponents offer and the negotiation
is terminated successfully; the Opponent rejects the Proponents offer, makes a counter offer and
the negotiation is continued (i.e., we pass to the next stage); or the Opponent rejects the offer,
but the two parties cannot converge on an agreement so there is no point in negotiating, and the
negotiation is terminated with a failure.
We illustrate with a simple bargaining example.
Mary is interested in buying a computer system advertised for $1300. She wants to negotiate to
buy the advertised system at a lower price. The seller has a cash-flow crisis and is keen to make
sales immediately. They estimate the loss of a sale to a customer in the shop costs them $50
in bank interest and advertising costs. The total cost of the system components is $1000. We
assume for simplicity that the features of the system are fixed, and the negotiation is conducted
over a single issue; the price of the system.
Tactics are the practical expression of strategies and we represent them as functions that gen-
erate new offers. These functions can be simple or complex depending on the strategy and the
amount of information they incorporate. Complex tactics can include the negotiation rules and
the history of previous offers. We represent tactics with the f (x,y) predicate. Possible tactic
functions available to the seller in this scenario include:
• reducing the previous offer by a fixed amount or fixed percentage
• reducing the previous offer by the same amount or percentage evidenced by the buyers
offers
• reducing the margin over cost
• increasing the discount
• changing the configuration
• changing the terms of sale
Many of these tactics can also be used by the buyer.
The predicates for this simple negotiation are:
• cost(x,y) the cost y of the system x.
• sellerPrice(x,y) the price y of the system x.
• buyerOffer(x,y) how much y the buyer is willing to pay for the system x.
• minimumPrice(x,y) the sellers minimum price.
• maximumPrice(x,y) the buyers maximum price.
• immediate whether or not payment is made immediately or delayed.
• f (x,y) a tactic function used to generate the next offer price y for the system x.
Protocol Rules
• p1 : ⇒ negotiate
• p2 : negotiate,step(n)⇒ step(n+1)
• p3 : buyerOffert(x,y),sellerPricet(x,z), |y− z|> $500⇒¬negotiate
• p4 : acceptable⇒¬negotiate
Rule s6 and rule b5 show that offers are ordered over time and the next prices for buyers and
sellers are based on their previous price and the selected tactic function. In general, we would
expect the sellers tactic function to reduce, and the buyers tactic function to increase the price
offered in each round. In order to stop fruitless negotiation p3 allows for negotiations to cease
if the offers diverge by an arbitrary amount, $500 in this case. Rule p4 ends the negotiations
when an offer is accepted.
Rules p1 and p2 guide the negotiation process, if the negotiation is not terminated due to failure
or completion, then proceed to the next step.
The tactic functions themselves may also change during the negotiation process. Changes may
be in response to what is learned about the opponents preferences and tactics, the time remaining
to negotiate, or new information received during the negotiation.
Seller Rules
• s1 : cost(x,y)⇒ sellerPricet=0(x,y+$300)
• s2 : cost(x,y)⇒ minimumPrice(x,y+$20)
• s3 : cost(x,y), immediate⇒ minimumPrice(x,y−$50)
• s4 : buyerOffert−1(x,y),sellerPricet(x,z),y≥ z⇒ acceptable
• s5 : buyerOffert−1(x,y),minimumPrice(x,z),y < z⇒¬acceptable
• s6 : sellerPricet−1(x,y)⇒ sellerPricet(x, f (x,y))
Rule s1 provides the basis for the sellers initial price and rules s2 and s3 define the sellers
minimum price, in terms of the cost of the system. Rule s3 also provides an additional discount
for an immediate payment.
The two rules s4 and s5 describe the sellers strategy for continuing or terminating the negotia-
tion. Rule s4 describes an ideal situation where the buyer offers to pay more than the next price
the seller is willing to offer, the buyers offer can be accepted and the negotiation concluded
successfully. If the buyers offer is less than the sellers next offer and rule p5 does not apply, the
negotiation will continue with the seller offering sellerPricet(x,z).
Rule s5 defines an unacceptable offer as one that is below the minimum price. In this case the
seller can either make their next (higher) counter-offer or terminate the negotiation according
to rule p3.
The superiority relation  is defined for the seller as: s3  s2. This relation shows the seller
will accept an offer below their cost, if the buyer is willing to pay immediately, however s5  s4
ensures the seller will not sell at less than the minimum price.
Buyer Rules
• b1 : sellerPricet=0(x,y)⇒ maximumPrice(x,y−$200)
• b2 : sellerPricet=0(x,y)⇒ buyerOffert=0(x,y−$400)
• b3 : sellerPricet(x,y),buyerOffert(x,z),y≤ z⇒ acceptable
• b4 : sellerPrice(x,y),maximumPrice(x,z),y > z⇒¬acceptable
• b6 : buyerOffert−1(x,y)⇒ buyerOffert(x, f (x,y))
The buyers maximum price is based on the sellers advertised price and is described by rule b1.
The arbitrary reduction of $200 provides a basis for the negotiation. Similarly the buyers initial
offer (b2) includes an opening ambit claim of $400 as a counter-offer to the sellers opening
price. Rules b3 and b4 describe continuation rules similar to the sellers rules s4 and s5.
The superiority relation  is defined for the Buyer as: b4  b3. The relation shows the Buyer
will not accept an offer over its maximum price.
The negotiation process is guided by rules p1 and p2, and is started by the buyer making their
offer buyerOffert=0. The seller evaluates p1, p2, and then evaluates the offer according to rules
s4 and s5. The seller can either accept the offer or make the counter offer sellerPricet(x, f (x,y)).
The buyer proceeds in the same fashion evaluating p1 and p2, and offers against rules b3 and
b4. The exchange of offers continues until either: s4 or b3 are true, and the negotiation is
successfully concluded. Or p3, s5 or b4 cause the negotiation to terminate without a result.
The negotiation starts at stage 0 (t = 0), and each stage consists of two steps: the Proponent
(Seller) move and the Opponent (Buyer) move. Here the Seller discloses the initial price
(sellerPricet=0), calculated from s1 using the cost of the system (a private piece of informa-
tion of the Seller); at the same time the private literals minimumPrice is derived. At this point
the protocol becomes active to determine whether the negotiation can continue. The only appli-
cable rule is pxx, from which +∂negotiate can be derived; thus the Opponent move is triggered.
The Buyer adds the public data of the Seller to its own facts and computes the resulting the-
ory, where the public data buyerOffert=0 as well as the private conclusion maximumPrice are
derived.
The protocol is fed with the new Buyer public data to decide whether the negotiation should
continue. The Seller price and the Buyer offer are compared, and if they are not too distant,
according to a predefined parameter, the negotiation moves to the next stage (rules p3 and p2).
Again the first step of the new stage is up to the Proponent, which adds public conclusion of
the Opponent to its theory. If the Buyer offer (buyerOffert=0), a new fact, is better than the
current proposal (sellerPricet=1 calculated from s6 according to the tactic function f and the
previous offer sellerPricet=0), then it accepts the offer and the protocol terminates the negotia-
tion successfully. Otherwise a new proposal is made (rule s6), unless the limit is reached (rule
s5).
A similar procedure is actuated by the Buyer, in case of a new offer from the Seller.
This simple scenario shows how defeasible logic can be used to describe both protocols and
strategies. More complex two party multi-issue negotiations can be described by additional
rules. These rules could provide values for each issue, the relative importance of issues to one
another and the preferred trade-offs between issues.
4 RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
There are several other logical approaches to two party negotiation (Tohme, 1997; Matos and
Sierra, 1998; Parsons et al., 1998). The work by Tohme (1997) suggests defeasible reasoning
can be used to evaluate and generate offers, however this paper concentrates on defining the
negotiation process rather than the use of defeasible reasoning for evaluation. Matos and Sierra
(1998) suggest Case-Based or Fuzzy reasoning approaches. The use of Fuzzy rules is a sim-
ilar approach to ours, but does not allow rules to be overridden in exceptional cases as does
defeasible reasoning. Parsons et al. (1998) use logical arguments (argumentation) to support or
“undercut” offers rather than for the evaluation or generation of offers.
Grosof et al. (1999) use Courteous Logic Programs (CLP) to define and prioritize business
rules. This work is extended by Reeves et al. (2000) with CLP’s used to express knowledge
about user preferences, constraints, and negotiation structures (auctions in this case). Antoniou
et al. (2000c) have shown that defeasible theories are at least as expressive as CLP’s.
Sierra et al. (1997); Faratin et al. (1998, 1999); Jennings et al. (2000) use Value functions,
a version of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) (Raiffa, 1982) to generate and evaluate
offers in multi-attribute negotiations. While value functions are effective for analyzing the
acceptability of offers, we know people have problems with identifying and defining utility
functions (Kersten and Szpakowicz, 1998; Borcherding et al., 1991). In this respect defeasible
reasoning provides a more natural way of expressing preferences and goals, and the possible
trade-offs between them.
Barbuceanu and Lo (2000) extends the MAUT approach with acceptability constraints and
constraint optimization. Acceptability constraints are used to define acceptable combinations
of attributes and attribute values. We believe this approach using both MAUT principles and
defeasible reasoning provides an excellent way for us to extend our work to encompass multi-
attribute negotiation.
However, as it has been pointed out by Antoniou et al. (1999), Defeasible Logic alone is not
able to deal with real-life cases, but it has to be supplemented with other formalisms and tools,
such as: arithmetical capabilities, temporal logic, etc. One solution to the problem we have just
alluded to is to use labels (Gabbay, 1996; Walton, 1998) to encode such additional features.
We can have two levels of labels: labelling the rules, for example with event-label; or we
can use labels inside the language, that is the literals occurring in a defeasible theory are just
propositional wrappers for complex entities. The first type of labels will enable a better and
more general treatment of the evolution of a negotiation and the steps it involves.
The use of labels and more negotiation strategies, for example using revision procedures for the
defeasible theories using the methodology of Billington et al. (1999), have to be devised. These
and other topics connecting automated negotiation and Defeasible Logic will be the subject of
future works.
REFERENCES
Antoniou, G., Billington, D., Governatori, G., and Maher, M. (1999). On the modeling and
analysis of regulations. In Proceedings of the Australian Conference on Information Systems.
Antoniou, G., Billington, D., Governatori, G., and Maher, M. (2000a). A flexible framework
for defeasible logics. In Proceedings of the American National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI-2000), pages 405–410. AAAI Press.
Antoniou, G., Billington, D., Governatori, G., Maher, M., and Rock, A. (2000b). A family
of defeasible reasoning logics and its implementation. In Horn, W., editor, ECAI 2000.
Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Amsterdam. IOS
Press.
Antoniou, G., Maher, M. J., and Billington, D. (2000c). Defeasible logic versus logic program-
ming without negation as failure. Journal of Logic Programming, 41:45–57.
Barbuceanu, M. and Lo, W.-K. (2000). A multi-attribute utility theoretic negotiation archi-
tecture for electronic commerce. In Proceedings Agents 2000, pages 239–246, Barcelona,
Spain. ACM, ACM Press.
Billington, D. (1993). Defeasible logic is stable. Journal of Logic and Computation, 3:370–400.
Billington, D., Antonoiu, G., Governatori, G., and Maher, M. J. (1999). Revising nonmonotonic
belief sets: The case of defeasible logic. In Burgard, W., Christaller, T., and Cremers, A.,
editors, KI-99: Advances in Artificial Intelligence, volume 1701 of LNAI, Berlin. Springer
Verlag.
Borcherding, K., Epple, T., and Winterfeldt, D. V. (1991). Comparison of weighting judgments
in multi-attribute utility measurement. Management Science, 37(12):1603–1619.
Faratin, P., Sierra, C., and Jennings, N. R. (1998). Negotiation decision functions for au-
tonomous agents. International Journal of Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 24(3–4):159–
182.
Faratin, P., Sierra, C., Jennings, N. R., and Buckle, P. (1999). Designing responsive and de-
liberative automated negotiators. In Proceedings AAAI Workshop on Negotiation: Settling
Conflicts and Identifying Opportunities, pages 12–18, Orlando, Florida. AAAI, AAAI Press.
Gabbay, D. M. (1996). Labelled Deductive Systems. Oxford University Press.
Governatori, G. and Maher, M. J. (2000). An argumentation-theoretic characterization of defea-
sible logic. In Horn, W., editor, ECAI 2000. Proceedings of the 14th European Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Amsterdam. IOS Press.
Governatori, G., Maher, M. J., Antoniou, G., and Billington, D. (2000). Argumentation seman-
tics for defeasible logics. In Mizoguchi, R. and Slaney, J., editors, PRICAI 2000: Topics in
Artificial Intelligence, volume 1886 of LNAI, pages 27–37, Berlin. Springer Verlag.
Grosof, B. N., Labrou, Y., and Chan, H. Y. (1999). A declarative approach to business rules in
contracts: Courteous logic programs in XML. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce (EC99), Denver, Colorado. ACM, ACM Press.
Jennings, N. R., Parsons, S., Sierra, C., and Faratin, P. (2000). Automated negotiation. In
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on the Practical Applications of Intelligent
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, PAAM, pages 23–30.
Kersten, G. E. and Szpakowicz, S. (1998). Modelling business negotiations for electronic com-
merce. In Intelligent Information Systems: Proceedings of the 7th Workshop, pages 17–28,
Warsaw. IPI PAN.
Loui, R. (1998). Process and policy: resource-bounded non-demonstrative reasoning. Compu-
tational Intelligence, 14:1–38.
Maher, M. J., Rock, A., Antoniou, G., Billington, D., and Miller, T. (2000). Efficient defeasi-
ble reasoning systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Tools with
Artificial Intelligence.
Matos, N. and Sierra, C. (1998). Evolutionary computing and negotiating agents. In Proceed-
ings of the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Trading (AMET’98), pages 91–111, St
Paul, Minneapolis.
Parsons, S. D., Sierra, C. A., and Jennings, N. R. (1998). Agents that reason and negotiate by
arguing. Journal of Logic and Computation, 8(3):261–292.
Prakken, H. (Forthcoming). Relating protocols for dynamic dispute with logics for defeasible
argumentation. Synthese.
Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Reeves, D. M., Wellman, M. P., Grosof, B. N., and Chan, H. Y. (2000). Automated negotiation
from declarative contract descriptions. In Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence, Workshop on Knowledge-Based Electronic Markets(KBEM), Austin, Texas. AAAI,
AAAI Press.
Sierra, C., Faratin, P., and Jennings, N. R. (1997). A service-oriented negotiation model between
autonomous agents. In Proceedings of the 8th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous
Agents in a Multi-Agent World (MAAMAW’97), pages 17–35, Ronneby, Sweden.
Tohme, F. (1997). Negotiation and defeasible reasons for choice. Presented at the AAAI Spring
Symposium on Qualitative Preferences in Deliberation and Practical Reasoning, Stanford
University, California.
Walton, D. (1998). Applying labelled deductive systems and multi-agent systems to source-
based argumentation. Journal of Logic and Computation, 9:63–80.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Grigoris Antoniou, David Billington, Marlon Dumas and Antonino
Rotolo for fruitful discussions on defeasible logic and its application to e-commerce, automated
negotiation and other fields.
COPYRIGHT
G. Governatori, A.H.M. ter Hofstede, P. Oaks c© 2000. The authors assign to ACIS and educa-
tional and non-profit institutions a non-exclusive licence to use this document for personal use
and in courses of instruction provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement
is reproduced. The authors also grant a non-exclusive licence to ACIS to publish this document
in full in the Conference Papers and Proceedings. Those documents may be published on the
World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. Any
other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.
